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CHAPTER 6:
The Case for Federal
Pre-Emption of State
Blue Sky Laws
Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
THE NEED FOR LAWS TO GOVERN CAPITAL FORMATION
American society long ago abandoned an unregulated securities market and imposed legal requirementson businesses (issuers) when they offer or sell their securities to investors.'
In a market economy such as ours, impos-
ing rules on capital formation makes econom-
ic sense.' Without some regulation ofthe con-
duct of businesses offering and selling their
securities to investors, those businesses may
have an incentive to misstate or fail to dis-
close material investment information. This
may amount to unfairness to, and an undesir-
able fraud on, investors in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities.
Misstated or undisclosed material invest-
ment information may also facilitate an inef-
ficient allocation of precious market capital.
There is no way to be sure, for example, that
an investor's decision to turn over his or her
capital to a business amounts to an efficient
allocation of that capital, if that decision is
made as a result of the business's misstate-
ments of or failure to disclose material invest-
ment information.
Society's rules regulating capital forma-
tion are usually of two separate but related
types. First is society's antifraud rules, which
prohibit businesses offering or selling their
securities to investors from engaging in ma-
nipulative or deceptive acts. These antifraud
rules require that a business in connection
with its offer or sale of securities disclose all
material information to investors and refrain
from making material misstatements.'
Society's second, related rule governing
capital formation requires that a business of-
fering its securities to investors "register" the
securities or meet the conditions for an exemp-
tion from this registration requirement. Reg-
istration typically requires that the business
offering securities to investors provide closely
prescribed investment information to a desig-
nated governmental agency (typically through
the filing of a registration statement with, for
example, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and also provide that prescribed in-
vestment information to investors (typically by
providing investors with a prospectus)).'
These two broad types of capital formation
rules imposed by society'<-antifraud rules
and rules requiring registration-incentivize
the efficient disclosure of accurate, material
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investment information in connection with
the offer and sale of securities. Disclosure of
such investment information by the business
offering its securities to investors reduces
fraud and unfairness to investors and increas-
es the likelihood that market capital provided
by investors will be allocated to its highest
and best use.
These societal rules may, however, gener-
ate additional offering costs for the business
that is seeking external capital. The additional
costs may retard, or in some cases completely
choke off, the flow of capital from investors to
businesses. If, for instance, the costs (such as
accounting fees, legal fees, and filing fees) of
complying with society's rules regarding capital
formation force the company's overall cost of
issuing capital to rise above its expected return,
the business is unlikely to undertake the project.
The problem with the rules governing cap-
ital formation enacted by states, territories,
and the District of Columbia (state blue sky
laws) is that the registration requirements
of those blue sky laws raise the offering costs
of capital formation to an inefficient and in
some cases an intolerable level.
There are obvious and significant increased
costs generated as a result of imposing multiple
registration regimes on businesses soliciting
capital. If, for example, a company solicits
broadly for its capital, it may be required to
comply with the separate and independent
registration requirements of all of the 50-plus
blue sky jurisdictions. There are, however, no
material efficiencies or investor protections
generated by requiring an issuer to do the same
thing 50-plus times under 50-plus separate
and different registration regimes.
Unfortunately, the burden imposed by the
registration requirements of 50-plus blue
sky regimes falls disproportionately on the 5
million or so small businesses in the United
States, making it difficult for such small busi-
nesses to raise the capital they need to survive
and compete.
These small businesses are vital to the na-
tional economy.' They provide a wide array of
services and products and may account for as
much as 30 percent ofthe employment in the
United States. Even that large number, how-
ever, may understate the significance of the
economic energy and opportunity generated
by small businesses.
Although Congress has to an extent pre-
empted the registration requirements of
state blue sky laws, the federal pre-emption
is largely incomplete. Most important in that
regard is the fact that the pre-emption so far
offers scant relief to small businesses when
they search for external capital.
The federal government should complete-
ly pre-empt state authority over the registra-
tion of securities. Society needs a single set
of efficient rules governing the registration
of securities. Imposing 50-plus independent
registration regimes on capital formation by
businesses generates economic waste, high
costs, and inefficient conditions on business-
es-sespecially small busincsscs -when they
attempt to access the external capital that is
vital for their survival and ability to compete.
TODAY'S LAWS GOVERNING
CAPITAL FORMATION
State Blue Sky Laws. All states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the territories have laws
that govern the offer and sale of securities.'
These blue sky laws came into existence in a
flourish shortly after the beginning of the 20th
century." By the time Congress got around to
enacting the Securities Act of 1933,47 of the
then-48 states had enacted blue sky laws.'
Not surprisingly, historians may conclude
that blue sky laws were a response to per-
ceived fraud and manipulation surrounding
the offering and sale of securities.'?
Blue sky laws generally require that busi-
nesses offering or selling their securities
within the particular state must register those
securities with that state, providing the state
regulators and investors with prescribed in-
vestment information." Most blue sky laws
also have "merit" or "qualification"require-
ments, which are substantive standards that
must be met in order for a business to sell reg-
istered securities within the state."
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Blue sky statutes normally contain a num-
ber of exemptions from the state registration
requirements." One ofthe most common, for
example, is a small-offering exemption, which
may exempt offerings limited to a small num-
ber of offerees or purchasers from the state
registration requirements."
Most states also have a limited exemption
for offerings made under Regulation D ofthe
Securities Act ofl933." The prototype for this
state exemption, the Uniform Limited Offer-
ing Exemption (ULOE)/6 was promulgated
by the North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association (NASAA).Some form of
ULOE has been widely adopted by states. NA-
SMs version of ULOE provides an exemp-
tion from the state's registration obligations
for offerings that meet the requirements for
exemption from federal registration provided
by Rule 505 or Rule 506 of Regulation D and
also meet additional requirements imposed
byULOE."
Within our system of federalism, each
state exercises a significant measure of sov-
ereignty over its rules governing the offer and
sale of securities within its state. In the case
of the registration requirements imposed
by blue sky laws, this means that-barring
federal pre-emption of state authority over
registration-a business offering its securities
widely must meet the particular registration
requirements of each state where it offers
its securities to investors." Meeting the par-
ticular registration requirements of Kansas,
for example, does not necessarily mean that
the requirements of Nebraska-or any other
state-have been met. If, therefore, a busi-
ness offers its securities in four states, it may
be required to meet the separate and distinct
registration requirements in each of the four
states. If the offer is nationwide, it may be re-
quired to meet the registration requirements
of all 50-plus blue skyjurisdictions.
Blue sky laws also prohibit fraud or ma-
nipulation in connection with the offer and
sale of securities within the applicable state."
Most important, with regard to business capi-
tal formation activities, these laws require
that a business selling its securities refrain
from making material misstatements of facts
and disclose all material investment informa-
tion." States usually impose criminal, civil,
and administrative penalties on a business
that violates these rules."
Federal Securities Laws. The bedrock of
the federal laws governing capital formation
came about with the passage of the Securities
Act ofl933 (Securities Act).
The Securities Act requires that business-
es offering and selling their securities must ei-
ther file a registration statement with the SEC
and provide investors with investment infor-
mation or, alternatively, qualify for an exemp-
tion from the registration requirement. 22
The Securities Act also prohibits fraud and
manipulation in connection with the capital
raising activities of businesses.P
Both the registration provisions and the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act are
broadly applicable, establishing jurisdiction
by even the slightest brush with interstate
facilities or transportation.s' This means that
any wide offering of securities by a business is
subject not only to the 50-plus state blue sky
laws but also to the Securities Act aswell.
Although there are significant overlaps and
duplications, there are differences between
blue sky laws and the Securities Act.
One important difference is that the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act are
based on a disclosure philosophy, while the
registration requirements of blue sky laws
are, as described above, generally based on a
qualification or merit philosophy." Registra-
tion at the federal level, therefore, does not
require the registrant to meet any substantive
requirements regarding the quality or price of
the investment. The issuer's only obligation
under the Securities Act is to disclose pre-
scribed investment information to the SEC
and to investors." The registrant does not
have to convince the SEC that the offering is
a fair deal for investors.
It is worth noting here that Congress
in 1933 got this right. In a market econo-
my, allocation of capital and the pricing of
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investments must be left to the capital market.
Assigning that responsibility to bureaucrats
would amount to an economic disaster. Capi-
tal formation would be outrageously expen-
sive and destructively slow. Allowing bureau-
crats to limit the flow of capital only to deals
that they determine to be well priced and fair
would ensure an inefficient allocation of mar-
ket capital. With the Securities Act, Congress
correctly tried to enhance an efficient alloca-
tion of capital by improving information flows
among the parties. It did this by incentivizing
the most efficient provider of investment in-
formation, which is the issuer, to make that
information available to the parties involved
in the reallocation of market capital.
The exemptions from registration in
the 1933 act and in state blue sky laws are
also different.
While the statutory and regulatory exemp-
tions from federal registration under the Se-
curities Act have not been entirely economi-
cally sound in all cases, Congress and the SEC
in recent decades have made progress in mov-
ing the federal regime in the right direction,
They have done this by expanding exemptions
in situations in which the costs of registration
will practically foreclose small businesses
from the capital markets and in situations
where the parties to the transaction have
cheap access to investment information.
This sensible evolution under the Securi-
ties Act is captured by a provision in the Na-
tional Securities Market Improvement Act
(NSMIA) of 1996, which amended Section
2(b) of the Securities Act. As thus amended,
Section 2(b) mandates a rational and balanced
approach toward the federal regime governing
capital formation. Section 2(b) of the 1933act
states that when the SEC is enacting regula-
tions "in the public interest, [it] shall also con-
sider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.'?"
As originally adopted, there was, how-
ever, a fundamental flaw in the 1933 act: It
did not pre-empt state authority over regis-
tration. States retained authority over the
registration of securities offered in the partic-
ular state, including the authority to enforce
merit requirements.
Continuing state authority over registra-
tion meant, for example, that if an issuer
wanted to offer its securities broadly through
a public medium-in 1933,perhaps, in a news-
paper advertisement, or today by posting a
notice on the issuer's website-the issuer was
more than likely required to meet the federal
registration requirements, all state registra-
tion requirements, and all applicable state
merit requirements. The issuer was, in short,
subject to 50-plus separate regimes, each
with its own individual registration rules and
in most cases merit rules.
This overall regime continued unabated
for more than half a century and to a signifi-
cant extent continues today.
THE PRE-EMPTION OF STATE
AUTHORITY OVER REGISTRATION
The federal government has pre-empted
some state authority over registration. This
is a result of provisions in NSMIA and the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)Act.
NSMIA pre-empted state registration au-
thority over offerings by issuers traded on
national securities exchanges" and offerings
by registered investment companies (mutual
funds)."?
NSMIA also pre-empted state registra-
tion authority over offerings conducted un-
der Rule 506 of Regulation 0.30 Meeting the
requirements of Rule 506 for an exemption
from the federal registration obligation re-
quires that the investors must either be so-
phisticated or accredited (such as wealthy
investors or insiders), and unaccredited in-
vestors must be provided with extensive, pre-
scribed investment information."
In NSMIA, Congress also delegated au-
thority to the SEC to expand pre-emption by
regulation to offers limited to "qualified pur-
chasers as defined by the Commission."> The
only restriction on the breadth of this delega-
tion to the SECto define "qualified purchasers"
is that the definition of "qualified purchasers"
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must be "consistent with the public interest
and the protection of investors."33The SEC
has never used this provision to expand pre-
emption of state authority over registration.
The JOBS Act pre-empted state registra-
tion authority over offerings under the new
crowdfunding exemption." That exemption
from federal registration is available for of-
ferings made exclusively on the Internet, is
limited both with regard to the total amount
of the offering and the amount any investor
may purchase, and requires the disclosure of
investment information."
The JOBS Act3• also delegated authority
to the SEC to pre-empt state registration au-
thority over offerings under the new Regula-
tion A rules (generally referred to as Regula-
tionA+ rules), provided the offering is limited
to "a qualified purchaser, as defined by the
Commission.":" The exemption provided by
Regulation A+ is predicated on the disclosure
of prescribed investment information to the
SEC and investors, and the amount of infor-
mation required to be disclosed depends on
the size of the offerings. Offerings of up to $20
million (Tier 1offerings) require substantially
less disclosure than offerings of up to $50 mil-
lion (Tier 2 offerings). The final Regulation A+
rules pre-empt state registration authority
over Tier 2offerings but do not pre-empt state
registration authority over Tier 1offerings.
State authority over registration continues
for all other offerings of securities by issuers.
These include: (1) registered offerings by issu-
ers of its securities that are not traded on a na-
tional exchange; (2) private placements under
the common law of Section 4(a)(2); (3) offer-
ings under Rule 504;" (4) offerings under Rule
505;39(5) Tier 1offerings under RegulationA+;
and (6) intrastate offerings under Rule 147.
Offerings under the exemptions from fed-
eral registration listed in the preceding para-
graph-exemptions that are important to
small businesses seeking external capital and,
indeed, are largely designed to facilitate effi-
cient small-business capital formation-con-
tinue to be subject to the registration require-
ments of all blue skyjurisdictions.
IMPACT OF BLUE SKY LAWS ON
CAPITAL FORMATION
No argument is made here that states
should have no role in the regulation of capi-
tal formation. Indeed, state blue sky laws,
properly limited and directed, can playa ben-
eficial role in promoting an efficient alloca-
tion of capital and protecting investors.
The appropriate state role in the regula-
tion of capital formation involves the robust
enforcement of state antifraud rules.
State antifraud laws provide significant
economic penalties-for example, private
recoveries and civil and criminal penalties-
for the failure to disclose all material infor-
mation in connection with an issuer's sale of
securities. The economic costs to the issuer
of such penalties incentivize disclosure of
investment information, which in turn pro-
motes fully informed decision making and
protects investors. States should continue
to enforce their antifraud rules vigorously
and, indeed, should increase state resources
dedicated to the enforcement of their anti-
fraud rules.
The problem created by blue sky laws is
state authority over registration. These laws
and regulations significantly impede efficient
capital formation that is vital to this coun-
try's market economy. At the same time, these
state registration rules offer no economic or
societal benefits, such as protection of inves-
tors from fraud.
The pernicious effect of state registra-
tion rules is easily and vividly demonstrated
by considering the impact of those laws on a
business that proposes to solicit broadly for
investors. If, for example, a business intends
to announce its offering by posting informa-
tion about the offering on its website or by
advertising for investors in a widely distrib-
uted publication, the business seeking capi-
tal would likely be subject to the separate
and individual registration requirements of
each of the 50-plus jurisdictions that have
blue sky laws. In each state, therefore, the is-
suer would be required either to register its
securities under the registration provisions
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of that particular state or meet the particu-
lar state's requirements for an exemption
from registration.
Even if the offering were limited to four
states, the business soliciting for investors
would have four separate state registration
regimes to satisfy, which, again, could be sat-
isfied only by filing registration statements in
each of the jurisdictions or by qualifying for
an exemption from the registration require-
ment in each of the four states.
From a policy point of view, this of course
makes no sense. It increases the costs of a
critical element of an efficient market econ-
omy, which is an efficient access to external
capital. It is nothing short of bizarre for soci-
ety to impose an obligation to meet 50-plus-
or four, or two-separate registration regimes
on businesses seeking external capital.
While the pernicious effects generated by
the costs of meeting multiple registration re-
gimes is apparent, it is impossible to find any
material benefit in such an overall system. If
state registration authority were eliminated,
investors would still be protected by federal
registration provisions and by both state
and federal antifraud requirements. Impos-
ing 50-plus blue sky registration regimes in
addition to these investor protections adds
nothing of significance, except an increase in
offering expenses that makes access to capital
more difficult.
In all cases, the registration requirements
of state blue sky laws amount to economic
waste, generating costs without any eco-
nomic benefit. These state registration re-
quirements, however, have been especially
debilitating on small businesses in need of
external capital.
The reason that the harmful effects of state
registration provisions fall disproportionate-
lyon small businesses is due principally to the
structural and economic circumstances that
small businesses face when they attempt to
access external capital.
Small businesses usually seek relative-
ly small amounts of external capital. This
means that financial intermediation is likely
unavailable. Financial intermediation is a
fancy term for professional assistance (such
as from brokers or underwriters) in finding
investors. The yield from small offerings sim-
ply will not support the fees required by com-
petent and honest financial intermediation.
For example, in my research, I found that only
5.8 percent of Regulation D offerings of $1
million or less reported having any financial
intermediation.'?
Related to this is the problem of relative
offering costs. These are offering costs as
a percentage of the size of the deal. Offer-
ing costs of $100,000 are 100 percent of a
$100,000 offering but only 1percent of a $10
million offering. It is relative, not absolute,
offering costs that foreclose businesses from
the capital markets. Using these extreme
examples, offering expenses of $100,00 in
an offering of $100,000 (relative offering ex-
penses of 100 percent) will prevent the offer-
ing, while similar offering expenses in a $10
million offering (1 percent relative offering
expenses) should not foreclose the business
from the capital market.
These related matters-the absence of fi-
nancial intermediation and disproportionate
relative offering costs-are huge problems for
small businesses. Because small businesses
typically seek small amounts of external
capital, relative offering costs go through the
roof when small businesses are saddled with
multiple sets of registration rules imposed by
state blue sky laws.
A harmful consequence of state blue sky
registration requirements-a consequence
readily demonstrable by empirical data-is
the extent to which those state laws have
wrecked well-conceived, efficient federal
exemptions from registration designed for
small businesses.
Regulation A, for example, is an exemption
from federal registration requirements pro-
vided by the SECunder authority delegated to
it by Congress. The Regulation A exemption
requires a disclosure of closely tailored in-
vestment information, disclosures designed
to ameliorate the stifling requirements of the
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extensive disclosures required in a registra-
tion statement."
Although for decades Regulation Awas the
only exemption available to small issuers for
a broad, interstate solicitation for investors,
and although there are more than five mil-
lion small businesses in the U.S.economy that
inevitably will need external capital at some
point, offerings under Regulation A have
nearly disappeared. Data show, for example
that between 1995 and 2004, there were on
average only 7.8 Regulation A offerings per
year. Between 2005 and 20n, there were on
average 23.1Regulation Aofferings per year."
The apparent principal reason for the
non-use of this very attractive exemption was
state blue sky registration requirements. If a
small business in need of external capital for
its operation or expansion used Regulation A
as a basis for a broad solicitation for investors,
that small offering was subject to the registra-
tion requirements of all 50-plus blue sky ju-
risdictions, which amounted to an intolerable
burden for small businesses.
Data regarding the use of the exemptions
from federal registration provided by Regula-
tion D42offer what perhaps is even more vivid
evidence of how state blue sky registration
requirements have robbed small businesses
of the ability to use efficient, balanced federal
registration exemptions as a basis for access
to external capital.
Regulation Doffersbusinesses three exemp-
tions from federal registration requirements: (1)
Rule 504 provides an exemption for offerings
of $1million or less;" (2) Rule 505 provides an
exemption for offerings of $5million or less,"
and (3) Rule 506 provides an exemption for of-
ferings that are unlimited as to size."
Rule 504 is specially structured for small
businesses. There are no disclosures or offer-
ee qualification requirements (such as sophis-
tication or wealth) that are predicates to the
availability ofthe exemption provided byRule
504. On the other hand, in the largest of the
Regulation D offerings-Rule 506 offerings-
the exemption is predicated on all accred-
ited investors (generally wealthy investors or
insiders) or, alternatively, requires disclosure
of substantial amounts of investment infor-
mation and sophisticated investors.
This so-called scaled approach of Regula-
tion D-requiring more extensive investor
protection as the size of the offering increas-
es-is an appropriate response to the problem
of relative offering costs. Small Rule 504 of-
ferings, for example, are simply too small to
support the costs associated with extensive
and thus expensive disclosure requirements.
Capital formation for small businesses in
such circumstances would be stymied. In
striking a balance, the SEC was content in
the case of these small offerings to rely on
the ability of the parties to bargain for in-
vestment information and the more general
requirements of federal antifraud provisions,
which require a company selling its securities
to provide investors with all material invest-
ment information.
Notwithstanding the apparent attractive-
ness of a Rule 504 for small offerings, small
businesses have to a large extent abandoned
the use of Rule 504 and made these small Regu-
1ation Dofferings under Rule 506. In a sample
consisting of7,880 Regulation Dofferings of $1
million or less, 78.6 percent ofthose offerings
were made under Rule 506.47 Data also show
that more than 80 percent of these small Regu-
lation Dofferings that are made under Rule 506
are also limited to accredited investors."
The reason that small businesses abandon
Rule 504 and move to Rule 506 and limit their
offerings to accredited investors (persons
who may amount to less than 5 percent of the
total population)" is to avoid state blue sky
registration provisions. Offerings under Rule
506 pre-empt state registration authority.
In short, as was the case with Regulation A
offerings, state blue sky registration provision
wrecked the well-considered, efficient federal
registration exemptions provided to small
businesses by Regulation D. Again, therefore,
small businesses were the losers.
Small businesses are critical to the na-
tional economy.'" In regard to access to ex-
ternal capital formation, however, they face
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significant structural and economic disad-
vantages, which to a large degree are a result
of high relative offering costs and the absence
of financial intermediation. Imposing 50-
plus separate blue sky registration regimes on
small businesses seems to complete the cir-
cumstances for the perfect pernicious storm
for small businesses seeking external capital
necessary for them to survive and compete.
WHAT WON'T-AND WHAT WILL-
SOLVE THE PROBLEM
An efficient regulation of capital forma-
tion-regulation that ameliorates fraud and
misinformed investment decisions and pro-
motes the allocation of capital to its most ef-
ficient use-requires a single set of efficient
rules regarding the registration of securities.
Within our system of federalism, however,
achieving this goal has proven difficult.
States Will Never Eliminate State Reg-
istration Authority. The problem of the per-
nicious effects of state registration rules will
never be solved by states. The allure of sover-
eignty and the base instinct ofturfprotection
have proven too much for states to resist.
One should recognize, however, that over
the years, states acting through NASAAhave
offered initiatives and protocols seemingly
designed to enhance cooperation and sim-
plification in regard to issuers' meeting state
registration requirements.
Data show that although these initia-
tives have been broadly adopted by states, in
the end they have overwhelmingly failed to
ameliorate the pernicious impact of state
registration requirements on small business
capital formation. In that regard, consider
the following:
Small Company Offering Registration
(SCaR). Today's version of SCaR is designed
to provide a simplified state registration and
a coordinated review of that registration by
states. It is particularly designed for offerings
made in reliance on an exemption from feder-
al registration provided by Rule 504 or Regu-
lation A.s1While the SCaR protocol was ad-
opted by nearly all states" it is today virtually
unused. For example, the total coordinated
SCaR reviews in recent years were: four in
2012, four in 2013, and one in 2014."
Coordinated Review of Equity (CR Equity).
NASAA'swebsite describes this protocol as
a "uniform procedure designed to coordi-
nate the blue sky registration process among
states,'?" While CR Equity has been adopted
by the vast majority of states, 55 it is, once again,
rarely used. Between 2012 and 2014, only one
CR Equity was filed."
NASAA Coordinated Review of Regula-
tion A Offerings Review Protocol (Regulation
A+ Coordinated Review). After passage ofthe
JOBS Act, NASAA adopted a new coordi-
nated review regime for offerings under new
Regulation A+.57The protocol was adopted
by 49 ofNASAA's 53 members." As of March
7, 2016, only 10 Regulation A+ offerings had
been filed with the states for a RegulationA+
Coordinated Review,"
Not only have the NASAA initiatives
failed to reduce the burden of state authority
over registration, NASAA and state regula-
tors have also, over the past 30 years, waged
a coordinated, imaginative, and quite effec-
tive campaign to preserve state registration
authority over small businesses' offerings.
For example, in addition to the usual tactics
of offering testimony in the legislative and
administrative process and lobbying legisla-
tors, the anti-pre-emption forces were able
to insert a provision to rescind the NSMIA
pre-emption of state authority over Rule 506
offerings in an early iteration of the legisla-
tion that became the Dodd-Frank Act60 The
provision was not part of the ultimately au-
thorized Dodd-Frank Act.
Most recently, state regulators sued the
SEC, claiming that the commission's regula-
tory pre-emption of state registration author-
ity over Tier 2 Regulation A+ offering exceed-
ed its delegated authority under Title IV of
the JOBS Act." The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has now ruled in favor of
the SEC,holding that the pre-emption did not
exceed the Commission's delegated authority
under the JOBS Act,"
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History demonstrates, therefore, that
there is no chance that states will voluntari-
ly surrender, or even reduce, their registra-
tion authority.
The SEC Will Never Eliminate State
Registration Authority. The SEC has never
been willing to facilitate to any material ex-
tent the expansion of pre-emption of state
registration authority, notwithstanding the
demonstrable inefficiency and harm to small-
business capital formation wrought by state
registration regimes.
When, for example, the legislation that
in 1996 became NSMIA was under consider-
ation by Congress, the SEC refused to offer
testimony supporting a broad pre-emption of
state regulatory authority." Nonetheless, in
NSMIA, Congress delegated broad authority
to the SEC to expand by regulation pre-emp-
tion of any offering made to "qualified pur-
chasers, as defined by the Cornmission.?"
Since enactment of NSMIA in 1996, how-
ever, the SEC has never once used this dele-
gated authority under NSMIA to expand pre-
emption by regulation, even, for example, in
the face of overwhelming evidence that state
registration authority was wrecking the SEC's
well-conceived exemptions in Regulation A
and Regulation D."
In short, while the SEC has, for the past
20 years, enjoyed broad authority to improve
the efficient allocation of capital and provide
a meaningful remedy to the plight of small
businesses searching for external capital, it
has chosen not to act. Thus history suggests
rather strongly that the Commission will
never ameliorate, to any material degree, the
problem foisted on to small businesses by
state registration ruIes.
Only Congress Can Solve this Prob-
lem. The politics of pre-emption is such that
only Congress can solve the problem. Indeed,
looking back over the past 20 years, the only
meaningful steps to reduce the inefficiency
foisted on, and unfairness toward, small busi-
nesses caused by state registration authority
have been through congressional actions pre-
empting blue sky authority over registration.
NSMIA pre-empted state regulation authority
over Rule 506 offerings, and the JOBS Act pre-
empted state registration authority over offer-
ings under the new crowdfunding exemption.
CONCLUSION
Congress should pre-empt state authority
over the registration of securities complete-
ly. Efficient regulation of capital formation
can occur only if businesses, especially small
businesses, searching for external capital are
subject to one set of registration rules. Sub-
jecting businesses to more than 50 sets of in-
dependent rules requiring the registration of
securities makes no sense and can be under-
stood only in light of the history of misguided
actions by state and federal regulators.
States do, however, have an important role
in the efficient regulation of capital formation,
and that role is in the enforcement of their
own state antifraud provisions. State laws
that prohibit fraud and material misstate-
ments in connection with a company's offer
and sale of its securities make economic sense,
especially when backed up by criminal penal-
ties, administrative sanctions, and private
rights of recovery. Pre-empting state registra-
tion authority wouId leave states free to join
the SEC in its fight against fraud in connec-
tion with the offer or sale of securities.
-Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. ISSpears-Gilbert Professor at the Universityof KentuckyCollegeof Law.The
author's views and arguments Inthis chapter are expressed only to support his position on state blue sky
laws,and should not be read as endorsing the views of other authors inother chapters.
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